European Journal for Philosophy of Religion 2019-03-19T18:54:13+00:00 Prof. Dr. Georg Gasser Open Journal Systems <p><em>European Journal for Philosophy of Religion </em>(EJPR) is a peer-reviewed international journal devoted to the problems of the philosophy of religion.</p> Prospects for Panentheism as Research Program 2019-03-17T08:37:08+00:00 Philip Clayton <p class="gmail-msonospacing"><span>Panentheism is best understood as a philosophical research program. Identifying the core of the research program offers a strong response to the demarcation objection. It also helps focus both objections to and defenses of panentheism — and to show why common objections are not actually criticisms of the position we are defending. The paper also <span>addresses </span>two common criticisms: the alleged inadequacy of panentheism’s double “in” specification of the relationship between God and world, and the “double God” objection. Once the research program framework is in place, topics like these become opportunities for panentheists to engage in the kind of careful constructive work in theology and philosophy — historical, analytic, and systematic — that is required for making long-term, positive contributions to our field.</span></p> 2019-03-17T08:30:30+00:00 Copyright (c) 2018 European Journal for Philosophy of Religion Incarnation: In what sense is God really “with us”? 2019-03-17T08:37:09+00:00 Anna Case-Winters TBA 2019-03-17T08:30:31+00:00 Copyright (c) 2018 European Journal for Philosophy of Religion Nicholas Cusanus and His ‘non-aliud’ as Concept of God 2019-03-17T08:37:09+00:00 Johannes Stoffers S.J. <p>This paper presents Cusanus’ dialogue of 1462, named after and centred on the concept of <em>non-aliud</em>, and exploits its speculative resources for conceiving the relationship between God and the realm of finite entities. Furthermore, it points to the elements of self-constitution of the absolute and of the latter’s grounding relation towards the contingent. Finally, it is argued that Cusanus’ concept of <em>non-aliud</em> offers a valuable contribution to the present debate about an adequate concept of God.</p><p> </p> 2019-03-17T08:30:31+00:00 Copyright (c) 2019 European Journal for Philosophy of Religion True Imaginings Integrating Panentheism and A Personal View of God 2019-03-19T08:48:42+00:00 Klaus Müller The perhaps most challenging problem for a panentheistic paradigm in Christian god-talk consists in integrating the trait of personhood in the monistic horizon of this approach. A very helpful way to this goal seems to be the concept of imagination. Its logic of an “as if” represents a modified variation of Kant`s idea of the postulates of reason. Reflections of Jürgen Werbick, Douglas Headley, and Volker Gerhardt substantiate the philosophical and theological capabilities of this solution which also include a sensibility for the ontological commitments included in the panentheistic approach. 2019-03-17T08:30:32+00:00 Copyright (c) 2018 European Journal for Philosophy of Religion Euteleology Meets/Needs Idealism 2019-03-17T08:37:09+00:00 Thomas Schärtl <p><em>The paper compares the non-standard theistic notion of God as presented by John Bishop and Ken Perszyk in their so-called “euteleological” concept of God with idealistic, especially Hegelian and post-Hegelian concepts of the divine. Both frameworks not only share striking similarities, based on their guiding intuitions, but also share notable problems that have already discussed in 19<sup>th</sup> century speculative theology. The article offers some proposals to strengthen the euteleological concept of God ontologically – based on the insights coming from post-Hegelian discussions.</em></p> 2019-03-17T08:30:32+00:00 Copyright (c) 2018 European Journal for Philosophy of Religion The Ill-Made Knight and the Stain on the Soul 2019-03-17T08:37:09+00:00 Michael Rea <p>One of the main tasks for an account of the Christian doctrine of the atonement is to explain how and in what ways the salvifically relevant work of Christ heals the damage wrought by human sin on our souls, our relationships with one another, and our relationship with God. One kind of damage often neglected in philosophical treatments of the atonement, but discussed at some length in Eleonore Stump’s forthcoming <em>At-one-ment</em>, is what she, following St. Thomas Aquinas, calls <em>the stain on the soul</em>. The stain on the soul comprises the “moral leftovers” of serious evil, damage to the soul that goes beyond the guilt, shame, and separation from God brought about by sin and that lingers in a person even after she has repented and been forgiven. In this paper, I critically examine Stump’s account of how the work of Christ deals with the problem of the stain on the soul. I offer reasons for thinking that if the stain is exactly as she describes it, then it is indelible; and then I explore possible ways forward for her account of the atonement.</p> 2019-03-17T08:30:33+00:00 Copyright (c) 2019 European Journal for Philosophy of Religion Divine Union with and without the Gospel: A Probabilistic Problem of Pluralism 2019-03-17T08:37:09+00:00 Trent Dougherty 2019-03-17T08:30:34+00:00 Copyright (c) 2018 European Journal for Philosophy of Religion Stump's Forgiveness 2019-03-17T08:37:10+00:00 Brandon Warmke <p>To love someone, Eleonore Stump tells us, is to have two desires: a desire her objective good and a desire for union with her. In <em>Atonement,<strong> </strong></em>Stump claims that loving someone—understood as having these desires—is necessary and sufficient for morally appropriate forgiveness. I offer several arguments against this claim.</p> 2019-03-17T08:30:34+00:00 Copyright (c) 2019 European Journal for Philosophy of Religion The Doctrine of the Atonement: Response to Michael Rea, Trent Dougherty, and Brandon Warmke 2019-03-17T08:37:10+00:00 Eleonore Stump TBA 2019-03-17T08:30:35+00:00 Copyright (c) 2018 European Journal for Philosophy of Religion The Goals of Philosophy of Religion: A Reply to Ireneusz Zieminski 2019-03-17T08:37:10+00:00 Kirk Lougheed <p><span>In a recent article, Ireneusz Zieminski (2018) argues that the main goals of philosophy of religion are to (i) define religion; (ii) assess the truth value of religion and; (iii) assess the rationality of a religious way of life. Zieminski shows that each of these goals are difficult, if not impossible, to achieve. Hence, philosophy of religion leads to scepticism. He concludes that the conceptual tools philosophers of religion employ are best suited to study specific religious traditions, rather than religion more broadly construed. But it’s unclear whether the goals Zieminski attributes to philosophy of religion are accurate or even necessary for successful inquiry. I argue that an essentialist definition of religion isn’t necessary for philosophy of religion and that philosophers of religion already use the conceptual analysis in the way Zieminski suggests that they should. Finally, the epistemic standard Zieminski has in view is often obscure. And when it is clear, it is unrealistically high. Contemporary philosophers of religion rarely, if ever, claim to be offering certainty, or even evidence as strong as that found in the empirical sciences. </span></p> 2019-03-17T08:30:35+00:00 Copyright (c) 2019 European Journal for Philosophy of Religion ”Anti-theodicy” and Antitheodicies 2019-03-17T08:37:10+00:00 Lauri Snellman The article reviews different antitheodicies in response to Toby Betenson’s article “Anti-Theodicy”. Antitheodicies involve rejecting the position that God or meaning exist only, if evils have justifying morally sufficient reasons. The article builds on Betenson’s division into moral and conceptual antitheodicies and his characterization of antitheodicies as a metacritique of the problem of evil. Moral antitheodicies are problematic, as they do not address the key conceptual issues and might end up in question-begging or moralism. Dissolving the problem of evil requires a conceptual antitheodicy that exposes its presuppositions as speculative metaphysics. Religious conceptual antitheodicies help to focus on different ways of sense-making that do not fall into theodicism. 2019-03-17T08:30:36+00:00 Copyright (c) 2019 European Journal for Philosophy of Religion In Defence of Moralising Anti-Theodicy: A Reply to Snellman 2019-03-19T18:54:13+00:00 Toby Betenson 2019-03-17T08:30:37+00:00 Copyright (c) 2019 European Journal for Philosophy of Religion