An Inconsistency in Craig's Defence of the Moral Argument

  • Erik J. Wielenberg DePauw University

Abstract

I argue that William Craig’s defence of the moral argument is internally inconsistent. In the course of defending the moral argument, Craig criticizes non-theistic moral realism on the grounds that it posits the existence of certain logically necessary connections but fails to provide an adequate account of why such connections hold. Another component of Craig’s defence of the moral argument is an endorsement of a particular version of the divine command theory (DCT). Craig’s version of DCT posits certain logically necessary connections but Craig fails to provide an adequate account of why these connections hold. Thus, Craig’s critique of non-theistic moral realism is at odds with his DCT. Since the critique and DCT are both essential elements of his defence of the moral argument, that defence is internally inconsistent.
Published
2012-12-22
How to Cite
Wielenberg, E. J. (2012). An Inconsistency in Craig’s Defence of the Moral Argument. European Journal for Philosophy of Religion, 4(4), 49-58. https://doi.org/10.24204/ejpr.v4i4.259
Section
Research Articles