Zagzebski on Rationality

  • Duncan Pritchard University of Edinburgh
  • Shane Ryan Soochow University, Taipei

Abstract

This paper examines Linda Zagzebski’s (2012) account of rationality, as set out in her rich, wide-ranging, and important book, Epistemic Authority: A Theory of Trust, Authority, and Autonomy in Belief. We briefly describe the account that she offers and then consider its plausibility. In particular, in the first section we argue that a number of Zagzebski’s claims with regard to rationality require more support than she offers for them. Moreover, in the second section, we contend that far from offering Zagzebski a quick way of dealing with radical scepticism, her account of rationality actually seems to be particularly vulnerable to this problem.
Published
2014-12-22
How to Cite
Pritchard, D., & Ryan, S. (2014). Zagzebski on Rationality. European Journal for Philosophy of Religion, 6(4), 39-46. https://doi.org/10.24204/ejpr.v6i4.143